{"id":386,"date":"2026-11-19T09:53:35","date_gmt":"2026-11-19T08:53:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/it-news\/new-phishing-variant-gets-victims-to-approve-attackers-sign-in-session\/"},"modified":"2026-11-19T09:54:18","modified_gmt":"2026-11-19T08:54:18","slug":"new-phishing-variant-gets-victims-to-approve-attackers-sign-in-session","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/security\/new-phishing-variant-gets-victims-to-approve-attackers-sign-in-session\/","title":{"rendered":"New phishing variant gets victims to approve attacker&#8217;s sign-in session"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Researchers at KnowBe4 Threat Lab have discovered a new variant of device code phishing that targets Microsoft 365 accounts. The attacker sets up a sign-in session in advance, after which the victim logs in via the genuine Microsoft sign-in page and completes MFA. In doing so, the user unwittingly approves the attacker&#8217;s session, without a code ever appearing on screen.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>KnowBe4 reports that its Threat Lab discovered the attack method in August 2026. The technique builds on device code phishing. That method abuses a Microsoft feature for signing in on devices where entering a password is awkward, such as smart TVs. Such a device normally displays a short code, which the user enters on another website to approve the sign-in. In the familiar variant, an attacker initiates such a sign-in request and persuades the victim to enter the corresponding code.<\/p>\n<h3>Session already prepared<\/h3>\n<p>According to the researchers, the victim no longer sees a code in the new variant. The attacker initiates a sign-in session with Microsoft in advance and embeds the session details in a phishing page. When the user enters their email address there, they are redirected to the genuine Microsoft sign-in environment. There, they sign in in the usual way, including MFA, and unknowingly complete the session the attacker had prepared. The attacker can then obtain access tokens for Microsoft 365 data such as email and files in the cloud, without the password being stolen directly.<\/p>\n<p>KnowBe4 points out the difference with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks. In those, criminals position themselves between the victim and the sign-in environment to intercept data during sign-in. With this method, interception is unnecessary, as the attacker simply waits for the victim to complete the prepared session.<\/p>\n<h3>Attack via legitimate email service<\/h3>\n<p>The attack examined began with a phishing email asking the victim, with some urgency, to review a non-disclosure agreement. The attackers sent the message via Mandrill, Mailchimp&#8217;s email service, which allowed the email to pass the usual sender identity checks. Via several intermediate websites, the victim ended up on a page posing as Microsoft Defender. After a sham check and a request to download a document, the actual sign-in procedure followed.<\/p>\n<h3>Existing measures may miss variant<\/h3>\n<p>According to KnowBe4, the attack is harder for security systems to detect because the user signs in directly with Microsoft. As a result, the sign-in also passes FIDO2 and passkey checks, which are meant to prevent users from logging in on a spoofed website. Detection that looks for suspicious device codes being entered or for sign-in traffic being intercepted may also miss this variant, the company says.<\/p>\n<p>James Dyer, Head of Threat Intelligence at KnowBe4, notes that the victim does hardly anything out of the ordinary while signing in. No suspicious code is requested and the user lands on the genuine Microsoft website. Those, he says, are precisely the signals people rely on to judge a sign-in request as safe. Dyer argues that, in addition to checking whether a sign-in page is trustworthy, organisations should check whether a sign-in request matches what an employee is trying to do at that moment. An unexpected request to approve a document is, in his view, reason to be extra critical, even if the sign-in procedure that follows appears entirely legitimate.<\/p>\n<p>The researchers have published a <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.knowbe4.com\/the-hidden-relay-inside-a-device-code-phishing-kit-that-never-shows-the-code\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">technical analysis of the device code phishing kit<\/a> describing how the attack works, along with indicators of compromise (IOCs) and recommendations for defence.<\/p>\n<p>The full report can be read via <a href=\"https:\/\/blog.knowbe4.com\/the-hidden-relay-inside-a-device-code-phishing-kit-that-never-shows-the-code\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\">technical analysis of the device code phishing kit<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>KnowBe4 has found a phishing variant whereby victims approve an attacker&#8217;s session via the genuine Microsoft sign-in page. The company says MFA and passkeys do not stop it.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"mspb_bron_id":1169736,"mspb_url_nl":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/security-en-privacy\/nieuwe-phishingvariant-laat-slachtoffer-inlogsessie-van-aanvaller-goedkeuren\/","mspb_url_de":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/de\/security\/neue-phishing-variante-laesst-opfer-die-anmeldesitzung-des-angreifers-bestaetigen\/","mspb_url_en":"","mspb_beeld_url":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/hero-1795078403642.png","mspb_beeld_klein":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/11\/hero-1795078403642.png","mspb_auteur":"Redactie","mspb_beeld_alt":"","mspb_video":"","_yoast_wpseo_metadesc":"KnowBe4 warns of device code phishing in which attackers prepare a sign-in session that victims then approve via the genuine Microsoft website.","footnotes":""},"categories":[3],"tags":[],"layout":[6],"class_list":["post-386","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-security","layout-news"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/386","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=386"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/386\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":387,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/386\/revisions\/387"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=386"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=386"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=386"},{"taxonomy":"layout","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/mspbusiness.com\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/layout?post=386"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}